Separating Church and State: Transfers of Government Land as Cures for Establishment Clause Violations by Forster, Paul
Chicago-Kent Law Review 
Volume 85 
Issue 1 Symposium on Criminal Procedure Article 20 
December 2009 
Separating Church and State: Transfers of Government Land as 
Cures for Establishment Clause Violations 
Paul Forster 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, First Amendment Commons, and the Religion Law 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Paul Forster, Separating Church and State: Transfers of Government Land as Cures for Establishment 
Clause Violations, 85 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 401 (2010). 
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol85/iss1/20 
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT 
Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu, 
ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu. 
SEPARATING CHURCH AND STATE:
TRANSFERS OF GOVERNMENT LAND AS CURES FOR
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE VIOLATIONS
PAUL FORSTER*
1. Picking the Test: When Is the Establishment Clause Violated?
A . The Lem on Test ............................................................................ 403
B. Endorsement: Justice O'Connor Modifies the Lemon Test .......... 405
C. Impact of the 2005 Ten Commandments Cases ............................ 406
D. Current Composition of the Court and the Coercion Standard ..... 409
II. Applying the Court's Establishment Clause Jurisprudence to
Permanent Religious Displays
A. Lemon-Endorsement: General Disallowance of Permanent
R eligious D isplays ......................................................................... 4 12
B. Breyer's Van Orden Approach ...................................................... 413
C . C oercion Standard ......................................................................... 4 13
III. Remedial Analysis
A . A nalytical Fram ew ork ................................................................... 415
1. Constitutionality of the Sale Itself ............................................ 415
2. Curing the Violation Caused by the Display ............................ 417
B . C urrent C ase Law .......................................................................... 4 17
1. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. v. City of Marshfield
.................................................................................................. 4 17
2. Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles ........................................ 419
* .ID. candidate, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology, 2009. Notes
and Comments Editor, Chicago-Kent Law Review. The author thanks Professor Sheldon Nahmod for
his many insights and assistance, Matt Towey for his critical reading of the manuscript, and finally the
author's wife, Chelsea, for her unwavering support while he worked on this project.
CHICAGO-KENTLA W REVIEW
3. Buono v. K em pthorne ............................................................... 419
C. Application to Individual Fact Patterns ......................................... 425
1. Justiciability Concerns .............................................................. 425
2. Cases Ineligible for Remedial Sale ........................................... 429
3. Selling Land to Cure an Establishment Clause Violation ......... 431
INTRODUCTION
Whether it is a monument of the Ten Commandments on the capitol
grounds, a memorial cross dedicated to war veterans, or some other sym-
bol, many of us have experience with public displays that include religious
imagery. While such displays are scattered throughout America's commu-
nities, groups that advocate for strict separation of church and state have
begun to aggressively seek their removal.1 Some communities faced with
Establishment Clause litigation over a government display will remove the
object in order to avoid a lawsuit, while others are willing to fight enor-
mous legal battles in attempts to keep their displays. 2 Recently, some gov-
ernments have begun to seize on a new solution that lies between removal
and continuing government ownership of a display: selling the display and
the land on which it sits to private owners. Of course, any attempt at reme-
dial sale of this sort raises its own constitutional issues. In fact, the U.S.
Supreme Court will soon review Buono v. Kempthorne, renamed Salazar v.
Buono upon the grant of certiorari, a Ninth Circuit case that involves these
issues. 3
Because the Court may resolve Buono on standing grounds before it
1. See, e.g., Christopher D. Tomlinson, Note, Changing the Rules of Establishment Clause
Litigation: An Alternative to the Public Expression of Religion Act, 61 VAND. L. REV. 261, 262-63
(2008).
2. A different free speech issue can arise in similar situations, particularly if a private group
donated the display. Rather than arguing for removal of the display, the plaintiffs may argue that the
display constitutes private speech in a public forum, and that the government must therefore allow those
with different viewpoints to erect other displays. This was a losing argument in Pleasant Grove City v.
Summum, in which the Court held that permanent monuments in a public park, including a Ten Com-
mandments monument, constituted government rather than private speech. See 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1129-
30 (2009). The majority opinion did not analyze or even comment on any Establishment Clause issues
raised by the monument. Christopher C. Lund, Keeping the Government's Religion Pure: Pleasant
Grove City v. Summum, 104 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 46, 49 (2009),
http://www.law.northwestem.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2009/28/LRCoII2009n28Lund.pdf.
3. See Buono v. Kempthome, 527 F.3d 758, 778-79 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted sub nom.
Salazar v. Buono, 77 U.S.L.W. 3243 (U.S. Feb. 23, 2009) (No. 08-472).
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reaches Establishment Clause issues, 4 current Establishment Clause case
law may or may not be impacted by the Court's pending decision. This
article examines how courts should treat remedial sales in light of current
case law. This note will argue that, given certain requirements, even the
Supreme Court's strictest Establishment Clause tests should permit defen-
dant governments to sell land in order to cure Establishment Clause viola-
tions arising from permanent displays that include religious imagery.
Section I of the note discusses the Supreme Court's struggle to produce
clear and consistent Establishment Clause standards and describes several
tests that the courts use-or may in the future use-in Establishment
Clause cases. Section II explains how these various tests apply to perma-
nent physical displays on public property. Finally, Section III uses the
Lemon-endorsement line of cases to illustrate issues likely to arise from a
remedial sale of land. The section assumes an Establishment Clause viola-
tion caused by a permanent physical display on public land and analyzes
how a defendant government might use a sale of land to remedy the viola-
tion.
I. PICKING THE TEST: WHEN IS THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
VIOLATED?
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment provides that
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion." 5
This brief clause has defied a consistent or settled manner of application.
Over the last four decades, the Supreme Court has developed multiple tests
to aid its Establishment Clause inquiries but has yet to settle on any one test
that applies to all Establishment Clause cases.
A. The Lemon Test
In 1971's Lemon v. Kurtzman,6 the Supreme Court set forth a three-
pronged Establishment Clause test. Under the Lemon test, government
actions 1) must have a secular purpose; 2) may not as their principal or
primary effect either advance or inhibit religion; and 3) must not foster
4. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 12-17, Salazar v. Buono, No. 08-472 (U.S. Oct. 7, 2009),
available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral-arguments/argument-transcripts/08-472.pdf (raising
question as to whether government is precluded from appealing the standing issue); Br. for the Pet'rs.
12-20, Salazar v. Buono, No. 08-472 (U.S. June 1, 2009). In this case, involving a Latin Cross in the
Mojave National Preserve, the plaintiff lives in Oregon but alleged that he regularly visits the Preserve.
Id. at 4-5. He is a practicing Roman Catholic and admitted that he "does not find a cross itself objec-
tionable," but rather claimed that he is offended that the disputed cross sits on government land. Id.
5. U.S. Const. amend. I.
6. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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excessive government entanglement with religion. 7 Lemon itself concerned
government grants to religious schools for the purpose of paying teachers
of secular subjects. 8 The Court held the grants unconstitutional, reasoning
that although the grants met the first two prongs of its new test, government
funding of religious schools would risk excessive entanglement with relig-
ion.9
However, the Supreme Court has not treated Lemon as controlling in
all Establishment Clause cases. 10 The Court's reluctance to apply Lemon
probably arises in part because the test implies a separation of religion from
government more rigorous than the Court has been willing to enforce. Un-
der a faithful application of Lemon, any government action, no matter how
traditional or trivial, that has a "principal or primary" effect of advancing
religion is unconstitutional." Indeed, if the government truly violates the
Establishment Clause whenever it advances religion in any way, one might
expect that any government practice which prefers religion to irreligion
could not stand. 12 However, the Court has, both before and after Lemon,
held constitutional various practices that seemingly fall short of such com-
plete separation, such as laws prohibiting sale of merchandise on Sunday,
13
tax exemptions for religious entities, 14 opening legislative sessions with
prayer, 15 and the temporary display of a nativity scene by a local govern-
ment. 16 In fact, just as the Court's justices have argued over the formula-
tion of tests, they have disagreed whether the Establishment Clause
requires strict neutrality. 17, In spite of the controversy, both the Supreme
7. Id. at 612-13.
8. Id. at 608-09.
9. Id. at 613-14.
10. See, e.g., Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792-93 (1983); Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches
Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398-99 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring). In Lamb's Chapel, Justice
Scalia described the checkered past of the Lemon test: "Like some ghoul in a late-night horror movie
that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried, Lemon
stalks our Establishment Clause jurisprudence once again... Over the years ... no fewer than five of
the [then] currently sitting Justices have, in their own opinions, personally driven pencils through the
creature's heart . I.." d.
11. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
12. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 593 (1989)
("r[Prohibition against governmental endorsement of religion 'preclude[s] government from conveying
or attempting to convey a message that religion or a particular religious belief is favored or preferred."'
(emphasis in original) (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 70 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring))).
13. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,451-52 (1961).
14. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 673 (1970).
15. See Marsh, 463 U.S., at 792-93.
16. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 671-72 (1984).
17. Compare, e.g., McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005) ("When the
government acts with the ostensible and predominant purpose of advancing religion, it violates that
central Establishment Clause value of official religious neutrality") with, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545
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Court and lower courts nevertheless continue to apply the Lemon test in
certain situations, including in some cases about physical displays that
incorporate religious imagery. 18
B. Endorsement: Justice O'Connor Modifies the Lemon Test
In recent years, the dominant Establishment Clause test in the area of
physical religious displays has been Justice O'Connor's modification of the
Lemon test. 19 This two-pronged test asks whether disputed government
action has the "purpose or effect of endorsing religion.
'20 Justice
O'Connor's test essentially combines the purpose and effect prongs of the
Lemon test under a single endorsement standard, while dropping Lemon's
independent inquiry into entanglement. 21 The test somewhat narrows
Lemon, by prohibiting only government actions that rise to the level of
endorsement or disapproval of religion, beyond mere "advancement or
inhibition. '22 According to Justice O'Connor, the endorsement test "cap-
tures the essential command of the Establishment Clause, namely, that
government must not make a person's religious beliefs relevant to his or
her standing in the political community by conveying a message 'that relig-
ion or a particular religious belief is favored or preferred.' 23 Prohibiting
endorsement captures this central command because endorsement "sends a
message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the
political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they
are insiders, favored members of the political community. '24 Furthermore,
and relevant to the purposes of this note, the endorsement standard is
somewhat better tailored than Lemon to analysis of physical religious dis-
plays on public property, as these sorts of displays generally cause prob-
lems because of their alienating "message to nonadherents. '25 and the very
word "endorsement" implies a concern with such communicative effect,
26
U.S. 677, 684 n.3 (2005) (plurality opinion) ("[W]e have not, and do not, adhere to the principle that the
Establishment Clause bars any and all government preference for religion over irreligion.").
18. See, e.g., McCreary, 545 U.S. at 858-"0.
19. See, e.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 33 (2004) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring); but see McCreary, 545 U.S. at 859-63 (applying the first prong of the Lemon test but also
repeatedly citing Justice O'Connor's application of the endorsement test in Wallace v. Jaffree).
20. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 592 (O'Connor, J. concurring)
21. See id. at 592; Jordan C. Budd, Cross Purposes: Remedying the Endorsement of Symbolic
Religious Speech, 82 DENV. U. L. REv. 183, 187-88 (2004).
22. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 691-92 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Budd, supra note 21, at 188.
23. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 627 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S.
38, 70 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
24. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688; Budd, supra note 21, at 188-89.
25. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688.
26. See Budd, supra note 21, at 188-89.
2010]
CHICAGO-KENT LA W REVIEW
as opposed to other concerns such as entanglement.27
The endorsement test contains both subjective and objective inquiries
into government action.28 At the purpose prong, courts look to whether the
government's subjective intent was to endorse religion.29 For example, in
Wallace v. Jaffree, the Court held that a school's practice of opening
classes with prayer had the unconstitutional purpose of religious indoctrina-
tion.30 At the effects prong, courts then make an objective inquiry into
"whether, irrespective of government's actual purpose, the practice under
review in fact conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval. ' 31 This
objective inquiry theorizes a reasonable observer whose sensibilities are
determined by the "[collective] social judgment"32 but who at the same
time possesses knowledge of the "text, legislative history, and implementa-
tion of the [government action]... .",33 For example, in Santa Fe Inde-
pendent School District v. Doe, the Court invalidated a school policy in
part because of its history.34 The policy allowed students to deliver a "brief
invocation" before high school football games, but an examination of the
policy's history showed that it strongly encouraged students to deliver a
religious message. 35 As this type of analysis illustrates, the reasonable ob-
server standard supposes extraordinary factual knowledge, such that the
court can use any facts in the record to judge whether the challenged gov-
ernment action could reasonably be perceived as government endorsement
of religion. 36
C. Impact of the 2005 Ten Commandments Cases
In 2005, the Supreme Court further complicated its Establishment
27. But see generally James A. Campbell, Note, Newdow Calls for a New Day in Establishment
Clause Jurisprudence: Justice Thomas's "Actual Legal Coercion " Standard Provides the Necessary
Renovation, 39 AKRON L. REV. 541 (2006); B. Jessie Hill, Putting Religious Symbolism in Context: A
Linguistic Critique of the Endorsement Test, 104 MICH. L. REV. 491 (2005); Jesse H. Choper, The
Endorsement Test: Its Status and Desirability, 18 J.L. & POL. 499 (2002) (all arguing for abandonment
of the endorsement test).
28. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690; Hill, supra note 27, at 497.
29. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690.
30. See472U.S.38,56-61 (1985).
31. Id. at 56 n.42 (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
32. Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 780 (1995) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (quoting W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON LAW
OF TORTS 175 (5th ed. 1984)) (alteration in original).
33. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308 (2000) (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree,
472 U.S. 38, 76 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
34. See id. at 307.
35. Id.at 306-07.
36. See id. at 308; Budd, supra note 21, at 189-90.
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Clause jurisprudence with two cases-McCreary County v. ACLU and Van
Orden v. Perry, involving displays of the Ten Commandments on public
property. The dispute in McCreary centered on a legislatively-mandated
display of the Ten Commandments in county courthouses.37 This display
originally included only the Ten Commandments but later was expanded to
include more religious imagery. 38 In response to a preliminary injunction,
the county government eventually ordered the display altered to include
eight other historical-legal documents in frames of equal size, including the
Magna Carta, the Declaration of Independence, and the Bill of Rights.39 In
a majority opinion penned by Justice Souter, the Supreme Court held that
the display was unconstitutional. Applying the Lemon test, the Court found
an Establishment Clause violation at the purpose prong, in that the dis-
play's origin could only be explained by a desire of the county to encour-
age adherence to certain religious beliefs. 4
0
On the same day, the Court allowed a similar Ten Commandments
display in Van Orden v. Perry.41 The Van Orden display consisted of a six-
foot tall Ten Commandments monument on the Texas State Capitol
grounds, donated in 1961 by a private organization. 42 The display was one
of seventeen monuments surrounding the capitol. 43 In upholding the dis-
play, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for a four-justice plurality, while Jus-
tice Breyer penned a separate concurrence. 44 Finding the monument
constitutional, Chief Justice Rehnquist refused to apply the Lemon test,
declaring it "not useful in dealing with the sort of passive monument" at
issue.45 Instead, the plurality opinion looked to "the nature of the monu-
ment and [the] Nation's history. '46 The Chief Justice did not set forth any
tangible rule but rather went on to cite examples of government displays
similar to the one at issue, including prominent displays in the nation's
capital.47
Meanwhile, Justice Breyer, in his controlling concurrence, likewise
declined to apply any Establishment Clause test. He asserted that the Texas
37. McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 851 (2005).
38. Id. at 852-54.
39. Id. at 854-56.
40. See id. at 870-71.
41. 545 U.S. 677, 681 (2005) (plurality opinion).
42. Id. at 681-82.
43. Id. at 681.
44. Id. at 680, 698. Although they joined in the plurality opinion, Justices Scalia and Thomas also
wrote individual concurrences. Id. at 692 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 692 (Thomas, J., concurring).
45. Id. at 686 (plurality opinion).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 685-89.
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monument represented a "borderline case[]" where the outcome must rest
on "legal judgment" rather than any "test-related substitute. '48 He consid-
ered a number of factors, including the religious and secular messages of
the display, its origin, its physical setting, and the lack of complaints
throughout the monument's history.49 According to Justice Breyer, the first
three factors tended in the government's favor but the forty-year lack of
legal complaints proved "determinative," because this history showed that
the community understood the display as a message about cultural heritage
rather than a promotion of religion or a religious sect.
50
Reconciling Van Orden and McCreary is not a straightforward task.
Some have argued that the two cases are so inconsistent, given their similar
facts, as to completely fail in providing guidance to lower courts. 51 Squar-
ing the two cases is made more difficult by the fact that Justice Breyer, the
swing voter, did not write separately in McCreary, apparently agreeing
with Justice Souter's application of the Lemon test even while he refused to
apply any defined standard in Van Orden.52 Nonetheless, Justice Breyer did
distinguish McCreary in his Van Orden concurrence, highlighting the
"short (and stormy) history" of the displays at issue in McCreary, and the
"substantially religious objectives of those who mounted them. '53 Accord-
ingly, if Van Orden stands for anything, it is the relevance of the two fac-
tors that in Justice Breyer's mind distinguished Van Orden from McCreary:
1) the history of complaints surrounding a display; and 2) the purpose of
the government in allowing the display.54 The latter consideration already
existed as the purpose prong of the Lemon and endorsement tests, but the
former is new, and lower courts have begun to seize upon it.5
5
Moreover, although the case produced no majority, some lower courts
have taken Breyer's controlling concurrence in Van Orden as creating a
48. Id. at 700. (Breyer, J., concurring).
49. Id. at 701-02.
50. Id. at 702-03.
51. E.g. Newdow v. United States, 383 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1244 n.22 (E.D. Cal. 2005) ("As last
term's [Ten Commandments cases] demonstrate, the distinction [between endorsement and permissible
recognition of religion] is utterly standardless, and ultimate resolution depends on the shifting, subjec-
tive sensibilities of any five members of the High Court, leaving those of us who work in the vineyard
without guidance."); see also Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 698 (Thomas, J., concurring) (regretting that the
conflict between McCreary and Van Orden "compounds" the confusion created by the Court's inconsis-
tent Establishment Clause jurisprudence).
52. See McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 848 (2005).
53. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 703 (Breyer, J., concurring).
54. See id.
55. See, e.g., Trunk v. City of San Diego, 568 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1221 (S.D. Cal, 2008); Buono v.
Kempthome, 527 F.3d 758, 764 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted sub nom. Salazar v. Buono, 77 U.S.L.W.
3243 (U.S. Feb. 23, 2009) (No. 08-472) (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
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new, multi-factor Establishment Clause test for permanent displays. 56 Of
course, any person who claims that the opinion's pragmatic approach sig-
nals a new "test" must overcome clear indications to the contrary, including
the vagueness of the factors, to say nothing of Breyer's express resistance
to applying or creating a new test. 57 Nevertheless, some courts evidently
reason that drawing factors from Van Orden is the best way to honor it as
precedent.5 8 As articulated in a recent Ninth Circuit decision, Card v. City
of Everett, the Van Orden test makes three inquiries: the government's
secular purpose in acquiring the display; the strength of religious versus
secular message imparted by the display; and the history of complaints--or
lack thereof--concerning the display.59 A California district court applying
Card added three more factors of its own: whether the monument sits close
to government buildings; who donated the display; and whether the monu-
ment has a passive or proselytizing effect.60 Such multifactor "tests" do
succeed in providing a checklist for the fact-intensive exercise that Estab-
lishment Clause jurisprudence has become, but they rest on shaky ground
insofar as they draw from an opinion that seemingly rejects any principled
approach in favor of ad hoc judgments.
D. Current Composition of the Court and the Coercion Standard
Today, one must wonder whether the fine balance between Van Orden
and McCreary truly reflects the current composition of the Court.61 With
three additions to the court since Van Orden and McCreary were decided,
and particularly with the replacement of Justice O'Connor by Justice Alito,
it would seem that the Lemon and endorsement tests are at risk.62 Justice
Alito tended to favor defendants in Establishment Clause cases during his
tenure on the Third Circuit,63 which suggests that he may be open to relig-
56. See Card v. City of Everett, 520 F.3d 1009, 1019-21 (9th Cir. 2008); Trunk, 568 F. Supp. 2d
at 1218. Other cases using Van Orden as controlling precedent have simply drawn parallels between
Van Orden and the case at hand. See ACLU Neb. Found. v. City of Plattsmouth, 419 F.3d 772, 778 (8th
Cir. 2005) (en banc); Twombly v. City of Fargo, 388 F. Supp. 2d 983, 990-91 (D.N.D. 2005).
57. See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 700.
58. Card, 520 F.3d at 1019-21; cf also Plattsmouth, 419 F.3d at 778 (not applying factors but
disposing of the case on the grounds of its factual similarity to Van Orden).
59. Card, 520F.3dat 1019-21.
60. Trunk, 568 F. Supp. 2d at 1218.
61. See RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 21.3(e)
(4th ed. 2008) (noting that changes in the Court's makeup render these decisions "of questionable
importance for the future").
62. See, e.g., Jason Marques, Note, To Bear a Cross: The Establishment Clause, Historic Preser-
vation, and Eminent Domain Intersect at the Mt. Soledad Veterans Memorial, 59 FLA. L. REV. 829, 853
(2007).
63. See ACLU of N.J. ex rel. Lander v. Schundler, 168 F.3d 92, 94-109 (3d Cir. 1999) (upholding
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ion-friendly Establishment Clause tests. Notably, in a case upholding a
town display that included a creche and menorah, Justice Alito denied that
the display's constitutional validity could depend upon the incorporation of
secular symbolism. He wrote, "Demystification, desanctification, and de-
consecration suggest a process of profanation, something that the Estab-
lishment Clause neither demands nor tolerates." 64
Likewise, Chief Justice Roberts, while working as Deputy Solicitor
General during the first Bush administration, lobbied in two briefs for
abandoning the Lemon test.65 In one of these briefs, he argued for a coer-
cion standard, asserting that the government only violates the Establish-
ment Clause if its actions rise to the level of religious compulsion.66 During
his confirmation hearings, the now-Chief Justice highlighted the test's fact-
intensiveness as both its greatest strength and greatest weakness. 67
Justice Sotomayor's views on the Establishment Clause are somewhat
of a mystery, as she has addressed the provision in only a handful of cases,
none of which required her to lay out her interpretation of the provision in
any detail. 68
Meanwhile, Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy have often ex-
pressed distaste for both the Lemon and endorsement tests. The typically
centrist Justice Kennedy has sharply criticized the Lemon and endorsement
tests, complaining that the Lemon test has led to a "jurisprudence of minu-
tiae. '' 69 He has instead argued for use of a coercion standard.70 As Justice
Scalia put it, a coercion test should ask whether the challenged practice
"was coercion of religious orthodoxy and of financial support by force of
the Constitutionality of a town Christmas display that included a cr&che); ACLU of N.J. v. Black Horse
Pike Reg'l Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471, 1489 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc) (Mansmann, J., dissenting)
(joining a dissent from a holding that a voluntary school prayer policy violated the Establishment
Clause).
64. Schundler, 168 F.3d at 98-99.
65. Erwin Chemerinsky, John Roberts and the Establishment Clause and the Role of the Religious
Test Clause in the Confirmation Process 5-7 (Aug. 17, 2005) (transcript available at
http://www.acslaw.org/files/2005%20programs_-Chemerinsky-white%2Opaper.pdf) (arguing that the
confirmation of John Roberts would likely have far-reaching consequences for Establishment Clause
jurisprudence).
66. Id. at 6 (citing Br. for the United States as Amicus Curiae 6, No. 90-1014, Lee v. Weisman,
505 U.S. 577 (1992)).
67. Marques, supra note 62, at 854.
68. See Melissa Rogers, God in Government: Judge Sotomayor's Church-State Record, THE
BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, July 7, 2009,
http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2009/0707_sotomayor-rogers.aspx.
69. County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 674 (1989) (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
70. See id. at 659-61.
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law and threat of penalty."71 Meanwhile, Justice Thomas has questioned
whether the Establishment Clause should have even been incorporated to
apply to the states.72 Alternately, Thomas has echoed Scalia's concept of a
coercion test.73 After the most recent changes in the Court's composition,
Justice Kennedy or one of the new justices will likely replace Justice
O'Connor or Justice Breyer as the middle vote on Establishment Clause
issues. Thus, assuming the current membership when the Court next
squarely faces an Establishment Clause issue, it seems likely that the ma-
jority of justices will ignore or outright repudiate both the Lemon test and
Justice O'Connor's endorsement-centered modification of that test. 74 And
the critical moment may arrive soon: the Court may or may not reach Es-
tablishment Clause issues in Buono, depending on how it resolves the
standing issue.7
5
On the other hand, if one or more "conservative" justices were to
leave the Court while President Obama is in office, the majority view could
veer in the other direction. Whatever the future holds, a coercion standard
as of now has only been advanced by dissenting opinions and thus has no
precedential value.
II. APPLYING THE COURT'S ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE TO
PERMANENT RELIGIOUS DISPLAYS
Before addressing remedies for Establishment Clause violations, it is
useful to understand why a remedy might be necessary by examining how
the Court's various tests treat permanent physical displays at the liability
stage. This section briefly examines the treatment of such displays by the
Lemon-endorsement standard, Breyer's Van Orden approach, and a coer-
cion test.
71. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 640 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
72. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 45-46 (2004) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring).
73. See id, at 52 (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 640 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in
original)).
74. Cf Monte Kuligowski, The Supreme Court's Dilemma Respecting Establishment Clause
Jurisprudence, 38 Cumb. L. Rev. 245, 247 (2008) (arguing that stare decisis carries little weight in
Establishment Clause jurisprudence).
75. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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A. Lemon-Endorsement:76 General Disallowance of Permanent Religious
Displays
Courts that have applied the Lemon or endorsement tests to cases in-
volving permanent religious displays on public land have frequently held
that the displays are unconstitutional. 77 Such displays often run afoul of the
purpose 78 or effects 79 prongs in the tests. Exceptions may arise where the
religious symbol in a display can be characterized as secular in effect, often
because the display includes secular messages in addition to the religious
imagery. Common examples of these exceptions include Ten Command-
ments displays as part of monuments to legal or other secular history80 and
crosses as part of war monuments. 81 In contrast, bootstrapping arguments
about the long-time existence of a display are usually insufficient to confer
a secular historical significance. 82 Moreover, even defendants claiming a
contextually secular use of an ordinarily religious symbol remain far from
76. Although the Lemon and endorsement tests do contain subtle differences in their purpose and
effects prongs, their main difference is the endorsement test's dropping of Lemon's entanglement prong.
As such, where entanglement is not at issue, the courts tend to use "Lemon" and "endorsement" almost
interchangeably; cases concerning physical religious displays often include this sort of analysis. See,
e.g., McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 861-62 (2005) (using O'Connor's objective
observer in conjunction with the Lemon test); Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. City of Marsh-
field, 203 F.3d 487, 493 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing the three-part Lemon test as an inquiry into whether the
government has "endorse[d]" religion).
77. See, e.g., McCreary, 545 U.S. at 870-71; Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 40-41 (1980) (per
curiam); Ind. Civil Liberties Union v. O'Bannon, 259 F.3d 766, 773 (7th Cir. 2001); but see Trunk v.
City of San Diego, 568 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1207-18 (S.D. Cal. 2008) (holding that a war memorial that
includes a Latin cross did not violate the Lemon test).
78. See, e.g., McCreary, 545 U.S. at 870-71.
79. See, e.g., Ind. Civil Liberties Union, 259 F.3d at 772-73.
80. See, e.g., Card v. City of Everett, 520 F.3d 1009, 1019-21 (9th Cir. 2008) (characterizing Van
Orden as creating an exception to the Lemon test); cf also Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 703-04
(2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (holding constitutional a Ten Commandments display as part of a collec-
tion of historical displays, but not applying the Lemon or endorsement tests).
81. See, e.g., Trunk, 568 F. Supp at 1218; Separation of Church & State Comm. v. City of Eugene,
93 F.3d 617, 626 (9th Cir. 1996) (O'Scannlain, J., concurring) (reasoning that crosses serve a secular
purpose when part of a war memorial).
82. See Gonzales v. N. Twp. of Lake County, 4 F.3d 1412, 1422 (7th Cir. 1993); cf also Buono v.
Kempthome, 527 F.3d 758, 768-69 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted sub nom. Salazar v. Buono, 77
U.S.L.W. 3243 (U.S. Feb. 23, 2009) (No. 08-472) (disallowing a cross with a seventy-year history).
However, this tenet might be called into question in light of Van Orden, where a long and generally
uncontroversial history behind a Ten Commandments Monument proved "determinative" to convincing
Justice Breyer that the relevant community understood the display as "predominantly secular" in nature.
545 U.S. at 702.
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certain success. 83 As a result, many cases involving permanent displays of
religious symbols have resulted in courts finding Establishment Clause
violations, or in governments attempting to cure an alleged violation before
a lawsuit comes to trial. 84 Considering the prevalence of religious or quasi-
religious displays in communities across America, the question of remedies
for these sorts of violations is a growing issue.8
5
B. Breyer's Van Orden Approach
In an attempt to remain consistent with both Van Orden and
McCreary, some lower courts have begun to apply both Lemon-
endorsement and multi-factor tests derived from Breyer's controlling con-
currence in Van Orden to cases involving permanent displays. 86 Because
any factors to be drawn from Van Orden's ad hoc analysis will most likely
be highly dependent on the individual judge's impression of the record, the
results are somewhat unpredictable. 87 In practice, courts applying Van Or-
den "factors" tend to rule for defendants. 88 For instance, a recent Ninth
Circuit opinion applied both Van Orden and Lemon in upholding a Ten
Commandments display.89 Similarly, a recent Eighth Circuit analogized its
case to the facts of Van Orden to uphold a display and merely noted that it
would have come out the same way under Lemon. 90 In the end, given the
flexibility of Van Orden-type "legal judgment," 91 those courts attempting
to apply both Van Orden and McCreary will likely be able to massage their
Van Orden analysis to come out the same way as their Lemon analysis. 92
C. Coercion Standard
Under a coercion standard, most religious displays would be al-
83. Cf Buono, 527 F.3d at 770, 783 (disallowing a cross despite its designation as a national
memorial to World War I veterans); Ellis v. City of La Mesa, 990 F.2d 1518, 1528 (9th Cir. 1993).
84. See, e.g., McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 870-71 (2005) (holding that a
display violated the Establishment Clause); Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 395 F.3d 693, 696
(7th Cir. 2005) (defendant town selling a display in response to an alleged violation).
85. Cf, e.g., Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 689 (plurality opinion) (listing such displays throughout
Washington, D.C.).
86. See Trunk, 568 F. Supp. at 1206.
87. Cf Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 700 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("I see no test-related substitute for
the exercise of legal judgment.").
88. See Card v. City of Everett, 520 F.3d 1009, 1021 (9th Cir. 2008); Trunk, 568 F. Supp. at 1206,
1225; ACLU of Ohio Found. v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 444 F. Supp. 2d 805, 816 (N.D. Ohio 2006).
89. Card, 520 F.3d at 1021.
90. ACLU Neb. Found. v. City of Plattsmouth, 419 F.3d 772, 777-78 (8th Cir. 2005).
91. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 700.
92. Cf Card, 520 F.3dat 1021; Trunk, 568 F. Supp. at 1207-21.
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lowed.93 The government would have to coerce citizens in some way re-
garding religion before a violation occurred, and coercion implies some
sort of negative consequence for those who refuse to comply.94 It is hard to
imagine how a religious display in itself could violate such a standard, for
displays do not generally impose any obligations that one could refuse. For
instance, a law requiring all passersby to bow before a statue might violate
a coercion standard, but that violation would arise from the law requiring a
certain response to the display, not from the display itself.95 In contrast to
the Lemon or endorsement standards, nonbelievers would not be able to
claim a violation simply because they found it difficult to avoid a display
that offended them.96 Ultimately, because displays would not generally
violate the Establishment Clause, courts would rarely have occasion to
worry about remedial measures. As noted above, however, a majority of
the Court has never adopted a coercion test, so the standard has no prece-
dential value.
III. REMEDIAL ANALYSIS9 7
If application of any of the above tests results in an Establishment
Clause violation concerning a permanent display, some equitable remedy
will most likely be necessary. This section assumes an Establishment
Clause violation or alleged violation caused by a permanent physical dis-
play and proceeds to examine the issues that might arise if the defendant
government attempts a sale of land to cure the violation, as an alternative to
removing the display. It then illustrates these issues by examining them
with Lemon-endorsement 98 analysis, because that line of cases has been the
standard most often applied by the Supreme Court in the context of physi-
cal displays.99 If a court applies Lemon-endorsement in its initial ruling on
the constitutionality of a display, it only makes sense to apply that same
93. Campbell, supra note 27, at 584.
94. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542. U.S. 1, 52 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(reasoning that for a violation of the Establishment Clause to occur, the government must coerce reli-
gious practice "by force of law and threat of penalty" (emphasis in original)); Dictionary.com,
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/coercion (last visited Sept. 10, 2009) (citing MERRIAM-
WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY OF LAW (1996)).
95. See Newdow, 542. U.S. at 52; Campbell, supra note 27, at 569-70.
96. See Campbell, supra note 27, at 584-85.
97. For an application of a more restrictive understanding of the endorsement test to remedial
sales, see Budd, supra note 21, at 212-56, to which Section III of this note owes much of its analytical
framework.
98. See supra note 76.
99. See, e.g., McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 859 (2005); County of Allegheny
v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 623 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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test during any remedial analysis, because the same Establishment Clause
violation remains at issue. 100 Ultimately, given certain requirements out-
lined below, the Lemon-endorsement standard should often allow a reme-
dial sale.
A. Analytical Framework
In order to claim that a sale of land can cure an Establishment Clause
violation, regardless of which test one employs, the defendant must show
that the sale satisfies two separate constitutional concerns: 1) that the sale
itself is constitutional and 2) that the sale ends the impermissible state ac-
tion (i.e. sponsoring or hosting an unconstitutional display) that gave rise to
an Establishment Clause violation in the first place. 101 Regarding the for-
mer requirement, the sale itself must be constitutional because the sale
itself is a state action subject to the Establishment Clause. 102 Thus, assum-
ing that the court applies the endorsement test, the sale may not endorse
religion in purpose or effect. 103 Only after analyzing this first requirement
does one reach the second requirement, that the sale must end the originally
impermissible state action. 104 Logically, the government can meet this re-
quirement in one of two ways: by ending state action altogether or by trans-
forming the state's action into a constitutional sort. Below is an analysis of
both requirements under the endorsement standard.
1. Constitutionality of the Sale Itself
If a court applies the endorsement test and finds an Establishment
Clause violation, a sale of the land containing the display may nevertheless
be constitutionally permissible. The initial Establishment Clause violation
under this test would mean that the government through the impermissible
display had endorsed religion either in purpose or effect. 105 However, the
conclusion that a sale of land likewise endorses religion does not follow
merely from the fact that the land contains a religious display, because only
state action can give rise to an Establishment Clause violation. 106 When the
100. See Budd, supra note 21, at 216 (arguing for application of the endorsement standard at the
remedial stage of Establishment Clause litigation).
101. See Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487, 497 (7th Cir.
2000).
102. See Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 395 F.3d 693, 701 (7th Cir. 2005).
103. See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 592 (majority opinion).
104. See Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 493-96; Buono v. Kempthome, 527 F.3d 758, 782 (9th Cir.
2008), cert. granted sub nom. Salazar v. Buono, 77 U.S.L.W. 3243 (U.S. Feb. 23, 2009) (No. 08-472).
105. See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 592.
106. See Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 491.
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government completely ends its ownership and control over a display, what
was government speech becomes private speech. 107 Thus, the state act of
selling land does not violate the Establishment Clause unless the sale itself
advances religion in such a way as to constitute endorsement.
108
Rather than endorsing religion, the government's sale will often have
the primary and secular effect of encouraging religious tolerance and
avoiding religious tensions within the community by showing respect for a
religious monument that would otherwise have to be removed.10 9 More-
over, a remedial sale will often be a more attractive financial option for the
defendant government, allowing it to receive compensation for the display
rather than paying to have the display removed. 10 As long as the govern-
ment's action has a non-endorsing purpose and effect of this sort, it should
pass constitutional muster, even if the sale enables a private actor to prose-
lytize in the future. "'1
Some may object that the endorsement standard should only allow
sales of land to cure Establishment Clause violations in limited circum-
stances, because a government desire to preserve the religious display often
implies a preference for religion. 1 2 One analysis of the issue from an en-
dorsement perspective argues that selling land to cure an Establishment
Clause violation is permissible only where 1) "removal risks damaging or
destroying the symbol itself' and 2) "the expressive force of the symbol is
inextricably tied to its particular physical setting."'113 Only then, it is ar-
gued, do interests in promoting respect and tolerance for religion create a
sufficient secular purpose for transferring the land.1 14
The problem with this argument is that it overlooks the legitimate
secular interest in avoiding the political divisiveness likely to be caused by
tearing down a display. 115 Where the local community has strong emo-
107. See id.
108. See Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 395 F.3d 693, 699 (7th Cir. 2005); cf also Buono,
527 F.3d at 778-782 (analyzing whether the sale itself violated the Establishment Clause).
109. Cf Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 704 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring).
110. For instance, the defendant town of Marshfield sold the land at issue for the highest value per
square foot it had ever received. Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 490.
111. Cf id. at 493 (holding that the city did not endorse religion by selling the property at issue to a
religious organization).
112. See Budd, supra note 21, at 227-232.
113. Id. at229-30.
114. Id.
115. For instance, voters in San Diego passed a "Save the Cross" proposition by a seventy-six
percent majority, authorizing a sale of the disputed cross to private owners. Paulson v. City of San
Diego, 294 F.3d 1124, 1126 (9th Cir. 2002) (en bane); see also Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 704
(2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting that removing a previously uncontroversial display "could
thereby create the very kind of religiously based divisiveness that the Establishment Clause seeks to
avoid.").
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tional attachment to the display and any removal of the display will likely
result in political furor, the government has a good argument that selling
the land will curb political divisiveness.
116
2. Curing the Violation Caused by the Display
If the sale of land is constitutional in itself, a court should next con-
sider whether the sale brought an end to the state endorsement that arose
from housing a religious display on state land. Such a cure can occur in one
of two ways: 1) by ending state action altogether or 2) by transforming the
impermissible state action into a non-endorsing one. For instance, an un-
conditional sale of land will generally end any state action regarding the
land. On the other hand, a sale on condition that land be kept open to the
public will transform the government's action from an endorsement of
religion to a secular interest in the openness of the land. However, if state
action continues to qualify as endorsement, then the Establishment Clause
violation likewise persists, and the court will need to order further remedial
action. 117
B. Current Case Law
Three recent cases have given circuit courts a chance to squarely ad-
dress whether sales of land cured Establishment Clause violations." l8 A
careful reading of these cases reveals that they essentially utilize the ana-
lytical framework outlined above, inquiring into whether the sale itself is
constitutional and whether the sale cured the existing violation.
1. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. v. City of Marshfield
Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. v. City of Marshfield cen-
tered on a dispute over a statue of Jesus in a city park.119 After the Freedom
From Religion Foundation filed a lawsuit seeking declaratory and injunc-
tive relief, the city auctioned off the portion of the park containing the
statue to a private foundation, on condition that the land be used only for
116. See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 704.
117. See Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487, 497 (7th Cir.
2000) (holding that the defendant town continued to endorse religion despite its sale of land).
118. Circuit courts have also considered such remedial sales in the context of state constitutions, for
instance the California Constitution's No Preference and No Aid Clauses. See, e.g., Paulson, 294 F.3d
at 1133 (holding that a sale violated the California Constitution); Kong v. City and County of S.F., 18
Fed. App'x 616, 617 (9th Cir. 2001) (ruling that a sale violated neither California's Constitution nor the
Establishment Clause).
119. See Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 489.
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"public park purposes."' 20 The district court granted summary judgment for
the city. 12 1 The Seventh Circuit, in vacating and remanding the lower
court's ruling, 122 held that the sale of land itself did not constitute en-
dorsement of religion and that the sale transformed the display into private
speech, but nevertheless ruled that the layout and history of the park in
relation to the now-private property constituted an Establishment Clause
violation. 123 In reaching this conclusion, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that
the context of the display resulted in preferential access to a public fo-
rum.124 The court highlighted the historic association of the now-private
property with the public park, the dedication of the property to public use,
and the small magnitude of transfer combined with lack of demarcation as
persuasive factors in its decision.125 However, the panel also perceived that
demarcation between government and private land could fix any defect in
the remedial sale; rather than invalidate the sale, it remanded the case and
ordered the trial court to find a remedy that would create differentiation
between the private and public property. 126 On remand, the district court
ordered Marshfield to build a wrought iron fence and post disclaimer signs
around the private land.127
The Marshfield decision, although somewhat confusing in its word-
ing,128 essentially followed the steps of analysis set out above, while apply-
ing the endorsement test. 129 The court first analyzed whether the sale itself
was constitutionally permissible, looking to such factors as whether the city
unfairly favored the religious buyer or insisted on maintaining too much
control over the religious display. 130 Only after it concluded that the sale of
land was permissible did the court proceed to analyze whether the sale
cured the government's impermissible action vis-A-vis the display itself. 131
The opinion ultimately held that Marshfield violated the Establishment
120. Id. at 490. In fact, Marshfield sold the tract for the highest value per square foot it had ever
received. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 497.
123. See id. at 491,493,496.
124. See id. at 496
125. Id. at 494.
126. Id. at497.
127. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. City of Marshfield, No. 98-C-270-S, 2000 WL 767376,
at *1 (W.D. Wis. 2000).
128. The opinion states that the city's remedial sale "validly extinguished any government en-
dorsement of religion," only to proceed to find an Establishment Clause violation in the layout of the
remaining parkland with respect to the statue. 203 F.3d at 492, 496.
129. Id. at491,493.
130. See id. at 491-93.
131. Seeid.at493.
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Clause by failing to create sufficient separation between its land and the
now-private display; in other words, the court reasoned that the sale trans-
formed the nature of state action with respect to the display (the govern-
ment was now a neighbor rather than owner of the display) but that this
action nevertheless remained unconstitutional. 132 But rather than punishing
the private owners of the display for the government's violation, the court
ordered that the defendant government perfect the remedial sale by erecting
demarcation between the public and private land.' 33 Thus, the Marshfield
opinion illustrates how a remedial sale can be a viable option under the
endorsement test, if properly refereed by the court.
2. Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles
134
Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles is a similar case also arising in
the Seventh Circuit, in which the defendants defeated a lawsuit by mimick-
ing Marshfield's ultimate remedy. In this case, the defendant city of La
Crosse had accepted as a gift a Ten Commandments monument and placed
it on the edge of a city park, dedicating it to volunteers who helped save the
city from a great flood in 1965.135 When the Freedom From Religion
Foundation sued to have the monument removed, the city sold the monu-
ment and a small surrounding tract to the original donors, the Fraternal
Order of Eagles, on condition that the land be fenced and signage erected to
commemorate the volunteers who had saved La Crosse from the 1965
flood. 136 As in Marshfield, no bid took place, but the buyers did pay at least
fair market value for the land. 137 Moreover, the Eagles erected fences and
signs around the property almost identical to those ultimately ordered in
Marshfield.138 The District Court held that this sale violated the Establish-
ment Clause, but the Seventh Circuit reversed, noting the case's many simi-
larities to Marshfield. 39
3. Buono v. Kempthome
A recent Ninth Circuit decision, Buono v. Kempthorne, took a stricter
approach to a similar sale, but the case is now under review by the Supreme
132. See id. at 496.
133. See id. at 497.
134. 395 F.3d 693 (7th Cir. 2005).
135. Id. at694-96.
136. Id. at 697.
137. Id. at 702.
138. See id. at 697-98, 700-01.
139. See id. at 702-03.
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Court. 14 0 Buono involved a dispute over a Latin cross on federal land. 14
The Veterans of Foreign Wars had placed a cross on a rock outcrop in the
Mojave Desert preserve in 1934, without permission from the govern-
ment.142 It was visible from a highway about 100 yards away but otherwise
sat in a remote area. 143 The VFW maintained the cross over the years, re-
placing it several times, until controversy surrounding the display emerged
around the turn of the century. 144 In 2001 a former park service employee
filed suit to have the cross removed.145 The district court found an Estab-
lishment Clause violation and filed an injunction ordering the government
to remove the cross. 146 In response, Congress enacted successive bills des-
ignating the site as a national memorial (§ 8137), 147 prohibiting the use of
federal funds to "dismantle national memorials commemorating United
States participation in World War I" (§ 8065)148 and finally, providing for a
transfer of the cross and surrounding acre to a private buyer (§ 8121).149
Through a reversionary interest, Congress conditioned the sale on a re-
quirement that the land be maintained as a memorial to "United States par-
ticipation in World War I" and "American veterans of that war." 150
The district court invalidated the attempted transfer as a violation of
its injunction, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the attempted
sale violated the injunction because the sale could not end government
endorsement of religion. 151 The appellate court did not strike the sale as
divergent from the literal wording of the injunction, but rather analyzed the
140. See Buono v. Kempthorne, 527 F.3d 758, 779 n.13 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted sub noma.
Salazar v. Buono, 77 U.S.L.W. 3243 (U.S. Feb. 23, 2009) (No. 08-472) (declining to adopt Marsh-
field's presumption that a sale of land ends an Establishment Clause violation).
141. Id. at 768.
142. Id. at 760 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
143. See id. at 769, 772 (majority opinion).
144. Id. at 760, 769-70. Before the lawsuit, an individual petitioned the NPS for permission to
place a Buddhist monument nearby and was denied. Id. at 769.
145. Id. at 770.
146. Id. At the liability stage, Buono might conform with a rigid view of the endorsement test, but it
seems to clash with Van Orden; where the Van Orden display existed for forty years before its first
complaint, the Buono display had been around for seventy. Compare id. at 769 with Van Orden v.
Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 702 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring). Moreover, if one considers the location of a
display relevant to endorsement, one cannot help but compare Van Orden's Ten Commandments dis-
play on state capitol grounds to Buono's five- to eight-foot cross in a remote area of the Mojave desert.
Compare Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 681 (plurality opinion) with Buono, 527 F.3d at 768, 772.
147. Pub. L. No. 107-117 § 8137, 115 Stat. 2278-79 (2002) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §431 note)
[hereinafter § 8137].
148. Pub. L. No. 107-248 § 8065(b), 116 Stat. 1551 (2002).
149. Pub. L. No. 108-87 § 8121(a)-(f) (2003) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 410 aaa-56 note) [hereinaf-
ter § 8121]; Buono, 527 F.3d at 771.
150. § 8121,supra note 149.
151. Buono, 527 F.3d at 770, 783.
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attempted cure on substantive constitutional grounds. 152 It basically ad-
hered to the framework outlined above, first addressing the sale and then
considering continuing endorsement caused by the display. 153 The court
held both that the sale itself violated the Establishment Clause and that the
government continued to endorse religion vis-A-vis the monument.
The court highlighted three aspects of the transfer as problematic: "(1)
the government's continuing oversight and rights in the site containing the
cross after the proposed land exchange; (2) the method for effectuating the
land exchange; and (3) the history of the government's efforts to preserve
the cross." 154 However, given the facts of the case, all three of these rea-
sons pose problems.
The court's first reason for striking the sale was "the government's
continuing oversight and rights in the site containing the cross after the
proposed land exchange."' 155 The opinion explains that the various statutes
leading up to the sale gave the government continuing control over the
monument, both in that the National Park Service is responsible for main-
tenance of national monuments and in that the reversionary interest re-
quires the property to be maintained as a war memorial. 156 However, both
of these concerns fall apart under scrutiny. Concerning the supposed duty
of the NPS to maintain the cross, nothing in § 8121 (the most recent stat-
ute) requires the NPS to provide maintenance after the transfer to private
owners. 157 Moreover, few maintenance issues will likely ever arise, as the
cross simply consists of two pipes welded together and embedded in a rock
outcropping. 158 The court misstated the terms of § 8137 when it stated that
the statute authorizes the NPS to "install replicas of the original plaque and
cross located at the site."' 159 Although § 8137 authorizes the Secretary of
the Interior to make replicas of the memorial plaque and cross, this is
merely for purposes of "reinstallation of [the] memorial plaque," which in
turn communicates a purely secular message, dedicating the cross "[I]n
Memory of the Dead of All Wars." 160 Nothing in § 8137 authorizes the
152. See id. at 778-79.
153. Id. at 779, 782.
154. Id. at 779.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. See § 8121, supra note 149.
158. ERIC CHARLES NYSTROM, FROM NEGLECTED SPACE TO PROTECTED PLACE: AN
ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY OF MOJAVE NATIONAL PRESERVE ch. 6 (2003), http://
www.nps.gov/archive/moja/adminhist/adhi6.htm (last visited Sept. 12, 2009).
159. Buono, 527 F.3d at 779 (emphasis added).
160. Id. at 769-70.
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government to replace or otherwise maintain the Latin cross. 161 The mini-
mal ongoing government involvement contemplated in statute therefore
only involves the secular aspects of the memorial, as opposed to endorsing
any religious message. As for the reversionary interest, § 8121 merely re-
quires the land be maintained as a "memorial commemorating United
States participation in World War 1."162 By the plain wording of the statute,
the private owners of the memorial would be free to remove the cross as
long as they replaced it with another "memorial commemorating United
States participation in World War I."163 Thus, the Ninth Circuit overstated
the government's ongoing control of the land when it asserted that
"§ 8121(a) expressly reserves NPS's management responsibilities under
§ 8137."164
The Ninth Circuit next highlighted the method of sale as a second
problem, noting that Congress deviated from Department of Interior regula-
tions by failing to hold public hearings on the exchange or open bidding to
the public. 165 The court admitted that Congress's deviation from such regu-
lations was not dispositive, but it cited that behavior coupled with the trans-
ferees' "significant interest" in preserving the cross as sufficient evidence
that the VFW was a "straw purchaser."' 166 It is somewhat odd that the court
would even suggest holding Congress to a statute that governs a Congres-
sionally-created agency; not only are these rules not "dispositive" 167 when
considering Congressional procedure, they are wholly irrelevant. 168 More-
161. See§ 8137, supra note 147.
162. § 8121, supra note 149.
163. Id.
164. Buono, 527 F.3d at 780. The court attempted to emphasize the significance of the reversionary
interest by citing two cases in which reversionary interests led courts to hold that state action persisted.
See id. However, both cases involved racial segregation by the private owners. See Eaton v. Grubbs,
329 F.2d 710, 711 (4th Cir. 1964); Hampton v. City of Jacksonville, 304 F.2d 320, 320 (5th Cir. 1962).
Few would argue that the courts should treat religious expression with the same degree of scrutiny that
they treat racial segregation; indeed, whereas many argue that the government must show neutrality
toward religion, government action that results in racial segregation is reviewed under strict scrutiny.
Compare e.g. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (allowing government action that
"neither advances nor inhibits religion" (emphasis added)) with e.g. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S.
499, 505-506 (2005) (prescribing strict scrutiny for racial classifications). When a remedial sale is at
issue, the relevant distinction between the two types of cases lies in the fact that the government will
rarely have any cognizable interest in enabling ongoing racial segregation, but it may often have lawful
interests in allowing ongoing private religious expression-for instance in cases where a remedial sale
would encourage religious tolerance or prevent religion-based political tensions in a community. Cf
Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 704 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring).
165. Buono, 527 F.3d at 781.
166. Id. at 781-82.
167. Id. at 781.
168. See 16 U.S.C. § 4601-22 (2006) (defining procedures for the transfer of national park land in
instances where the Secretary of the Interior executes the transfer). The statue mentions nothing of
transfers ordered by Congress. Id.
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over, although the Ninth Circuit did not provide its own definition of a
"straw purchaser," a private party's interest in religious expression would
not ordinarily merit such a label. Rather, the term normally applies to sham
transactions where the transferee is a proxy for the real owner-for in-
stance, if the private party were only a proxy for the government's religious
speech. 169 In Buono, the argument for a sweetheart deal or a straw purchase
would have been more convincing if Congress had sold the land on the
cheap, or had required the purchaser to maintain a religious symbol. But
§ 8121 required the purchaser to exchange a five-acre piece of land for the
one-acre rock outcropping that contains the cross, 170 and as discussed
above, the government's only reversionary interest was purely secular in
nature. 171 These facts simply do not support the court's "straw pur-
chaser" 172 conclusion.
Finally, the court cited the "government's long-standing efforts to pre-
serve and maintain the cross atop Sunrise Rock" as a third reason that the
attempted sale failed the endorsement test. 173 The government may have
engaged in "herculean efforts"'174 to prevent removal of the Sunrise Rock
cross, but using the magnitude of those efforts as evidence of endorsement
presupposes that the government acted with a religious purpose. However,
where Congress itself has intervened in the dispute, the courts should not
assume without convincing evidence that Congress had a primarily reli-
gious purpose in acting; the Court has stated that it will "not lightly assume
that Congress intended to infringe constitutionally protected liber-
ties .... -"175 Thus, in deciding whether the government had a religion-
endorsing purpose when it sought a remedial sale, the courts should look
foremost to the stated purpose, if any, of the sale. 176 Here, the only stated
purpose of the government's action was a secular interest in preserving the
display as a World War I monument, as articulated by the reversionary
169. See Dictionary.com, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/straw man (last visited Sept. 10,
2009) (citing AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 2006), ("A
person who is set up as a cover or front for a questionable enterprise.")).
170. See § 8121,supra note 149.
171. See id. (requiring that the land be maintained as a "memorial commemorating United States
participation in World War I").
172. Buono, 527 F.3d at 782.
173. Id.
174. Id. (quoting the district court's opinion, 364 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1182 (C.D. Cal. 2005)).
175. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568,
575 (1988) (addressing cannons of statutory construction).
176. See Christopher Lauderman, Note, Building a Fence of Separation: The Constitutional Valid-
ity of Land Transfers in Escaping from Establishment Clause Violations, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1193, 1218 (2008); cf also EdwardJ. DeBartolo, 485 U.S. at 575.
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interest in § 8121.177 Moreover, unlike cases such as McCreary and Santa
Fe Ind. Sch. Dist., no legislative history exists to suggest that Congress's
stated secular purpose was merely a cover for a religious purpose.178 Thus,
the Buono opinion erred by focusing merely on the magnitude of the gov-
ernment's efforts to save the cross, rather than its purpose.
79
After holding that Congress's attempted sale violated the Establish-
ment clause by endorsing religion, the Ninth Circuit concluded its Buono
opinion by asserting that the attempted sale would not have ended the gov-
ernment endorsement of religion caused by the display.180 The court de-
clared, "[C]arving out a tiny parcel of property in the midst of this vast
Preserve-like a donut hole with the cross atop it-will do nothing to
minimize the impermissible governmental endorsement." 181 This statement
rests on firmer ground than the court's analysis of the sale itself. Much as
in Marshfield, even if the sale of land would not violate the constitution,
the transfer arguably fails to end government endorsement of religion, be-
cause the private land would be insufficiently separated from government
land.182 On the other hand, the defendants have noted that the Preserve is
riddled with 1,800 private inholdings, so perhaps a reasonable observer
would simply assume that any land containing a cross must be private.
183
Nevertheless, the small magnitude of the transfer, the lack of demarcation,
and the history of the specific plot as public would likely lead our highly-
informed reasonable observer to believe that the cross remained govern-
ment speech, or at least that the government did not care to separate its land
from the newly private land. 184 One can make a strong argument that de-
marcating the land in Buono could have provided sufficient separation, as
177. § 8121, supra note 149 ("The conveyance ... shall be subject o the condition that the recipient
maintain the conveyed property as a memorial commemorating United States participation in World
War I and honoring the American veterans of that war.").
178. Compare Buono, 527 F.3d at 779 with McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 851-
56 (2005) (explicitly religious dedication speech by a government official, as well as late addition of
secular symbols to the display); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308 (2000). ("invoca-
tion" as proxy for prayer).
179. Cf County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 592 (1989)
(identifying the key concern as whether government action has the "purpose or effect of 'endorsing'
religion" (emphasis added) (citation omitted)).
180. See Buono, 527 F.3d at 783.
181. Id.
182. Cf Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487, 496 (7th Cir.
2000).
183. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 4, at 20.
184. See Buono v. Norton, 212 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1216 (C.D. Cal. 2002), af/'d, 371 F.3d 543 (9th
Cir. 2004), cert. granted sub nom. Salazar v. Buono, 77 U.S.L.W. 3243 (U.S. Feb. 23, 2009) (No. 08-
472); cf also Budd, supra note 21, at 240.
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was the case in Marshfield.185 However, in contrast to Marshfield, the
Buono court merely ordered the cross removed without exploring this idea,
perhaps because it had already found the transfer itself to be unconstitu-
tional. 186
On February 23, 2009 the Supreme Court decided to hear the case,
now known as Salazar v. Buono.187 On October 7, 2009, the court heard
argument both on the constitutional issues discussed above, and on whether
the plaintiff had standing to bring the case. 188
C. Application to Individual Fact Patterns
After surveying the relevant cases, one may discern that although each
case presents unique challenges, several common issues often arise when a
defendant government attempts a remedial sale of land to cure an Estab-
lishment Clause violation. This subsection divides the issues into three
major inquiries: first addressing general justiciability concerns, then look-
ing to whether a remedial sale is possible given a particular display, and
finally analyzing whether the specific sale terms proposed by the defendant
government do in fact cure the constitutional violation. As discussed ear-
lier, for a remedial sale to succeed, the attempted sale must itself be consti-
tutional and the sale must cure the existing violation.
1. Justiciability Concerns
Before a court reaches the particulars of a remedial sale, it might have
to address justiciability arguments that arise from the sale itself. In particu-
lar, defendants may claim that the sale moots an injunction or ends state
action, thereby rendering the case not justiciable. 189 These arguments might
ultimately prevail, but as explained below, they will not obviate the need
for the court to examine the remedial sale on substantive Establishment
Clause grounds.
a. Mootness
If a defendant government sells the land under a religious display, the
185. See infra Part lIl.C.3.c.i.
186. Compare Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 497 with Buono, 527 F.3d at 782-83.
187. Supreme Court of the U.S. Docket for No. 08-472,
http://origin.www.supremecourtus.gov/docket/08-472.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2009).
188. See Br. for the Pet'rs. III, Salazar v. Buono, No. 08-472 (U.S. June 1, 2009).
189. Other justiciability arguments, particularly standing, commonly arise in these cases but do not
depend on the remedial sale. See, e.g., Trunk v. City of San Diego, 568 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1204 (S.D.
Cal. 2008).
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court will likely need to deal with a mootness argument, not only if a com-
plaint spurs the sale but also post-remedy, if the government sells land in
response to an injunction. 190 Even if the sale occurs post-injunction, the
court should perform a substantive Establishment Clause review of the
transaction, because "[i]n deciding whether an injunction has been violated
it is proper to observe the objects for which the relief was granted .... -191
Of course, this principle cuts both ways: defendants should not be allowed
to moot an injunction on the technical argument that they ended a constitu-
tional violation with an unconstitutional sale, but at the same time, courts
should not strike down an otherwise permissible sale simply because the
transaction does not comport with the precise wording of an injunction
ordering removal of a display. 192 Rather, the court should consider the "ob-
ject[] for which the relief was granted"--to end government endorsement
of religion. 193
Some defendants might broadly claim that a sale moots the current
litigation by ending the existing Establishment Clause violation and that
any Constitutional challenge to the transaction must be brought in a new
suit, but these mootness arguments are properly understood as assertions of
voluntary cessation. 194 As such, defendants must shoulder the heavy bur-
den described in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Ser-
vices (TOC), Inc., showing both that their illegal activity has ceased and
that "subsequent events made absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful
behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur." 195 In order to satisfy
this standard, defendants must show that their transaction truly cured any
Establishment Clause violation, as opposed to merely shifting the violation
from an unconstitutional display to an unconstitutional transaction. 196
Moreover, in order to verify that the sale extinguished any possibility of the
violation reoccurring, the court will need to examine the method of sale and
190. See Buono 11, 371 F.3d at 545.
191. John B. Stetson Co. v. Stephen L. Stetson Co., 128 F.2d 981, 983 (2d Cir. 1942) (invoking the
"spirit of the injunction"); see also Youakim v. McDonald, 71 F.3d 1274, 1283 (7th Cir. 1995); United
States v. Christie Indus., 465 F.2d 1002, 1007 (3d Cir. 1972).
192. Cf id.
193. Id.; see also Christie Indus., 465 F.2d at 1007 ("The language of an injunction must be read in
the light of the circumstances surrounding its entry.. . [including] the mischief that the injunction seeks
to prevent.").
194. See Budd, supra note 21, at 235.
195. 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000) (quoting United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Assn., 393
U.S. 199,203 (1968)).
196. See Buono v. Kempthome, 527 F.3d 758, 778 n.l (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted sub nom.
Salazar v. Buono, 77 U.S.L.W. 3243 (U.S. Feb. 23, 2009) (No. 08-472) (noting that constitutional
analysis of the sale falls within a court's broad powers to enforce its injunction).
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any conditions attached to the transfer. 197 Thus, mootness arguments do not
obviate the need for courts to conduct a substantive Establishment Clause
review of sales meant to cure Establishment Clause violations.
b. State Action
Aside from mootness arguments, defendants may contend that a sale
per se ends state action in that the government no longer exercises control
over the religious display. 198 For this proposition, defendants often cite the
plurality decision in Capitol Square Review Board v. Pinette,199 which
suggested a per se rule that private religious expression cannot violate the
Establishment clause.200 However, courts have yet to accept this argument
in the context of sales to cure Establishment Clause violations, instead con-
sidering any continuing government control over the land, as well as appar-
ent endorsement caused by the layout of public land with respect to the
display.201 Moreover, state action arguments cannot avoid the fact that sale
of public land is a government action itself subject to the Establishment
Clause. 202 Thus, although a sale may transform the religious display at
issue into private speech, courts still must examine the transaction to ensure
that the method and terms of the sale both satisfy the Establishment
Clause.203 In doing so, they must examine whether the inflammatory nature
or sensitive location of the display precludes a remedial sale. If a remedial
sale is possible, they must consider whether the size and shape of the prop-
erty sold, along with any demarcation, creates sufficient separation between
government and private land.
In addition, if the selling government attempts to retain a reversionary
interest or provide some sort of support to the buyer, the plaintiff may
claim that the display should be counted as government speech by virtue of
the entanglement doctrine. Under the entanglement (or alternately, "en-
197. Cf Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487, 492 (7th Cir.
2000) (allowing the transfer despite a condition that the land be used for public park purposes); Buono,
527 F.3d at 779 (striking down the sale in part because of a condition that a war memorial be main-
tained).
198. See, e.g., Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 491.
199. See id. at 493-94.
200. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 770 (1995) (plurality opin-
ion); Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 487.
201. See Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 494, 496 (holding that the layout of a monument in relation to a
public park violated the Establishment Clause by creating apparent endorsement of religion).
202. See Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 395 F.3d 693, 699 (7th Cir. 2005); cf also Buono v.
Kempthome, 527 F.3d 758, 778-82 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted sub nom. Salazar v. Buono, 77
U.S.L.W. 3243 (U.S. Feb. 23, 2009) (No. 08-472) (analyzing whether the sale itself violated the Estab-
lishment Clause).
203. See Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 493-94.
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twinement") doctrine, courts will treat private actors as government actors
"if, though only if, there is such a 'close nexus between the State and the
challenged action' that seemingly private behavior 'may be fairly treated as
that of the State itself.' ' 204 For instance, the Supreme Court's most recent
use of the doctrine held an interscholastic athletic association to be a state
actor, where the nominally private entity was predominantly composed,
funded, and governed by public schools.205 However, even if the doctrine is
technically applicable, it will seldom add anything to the type of cases dis-
cussed in this article. In cases where the government involvement after a
sale is so substantial that an entanglement argument could be won, the
plaintiff will likely find it easier to argue that the involvement itself vio-
lates the Establishment Clause by endorsing religious speech. 206 The aid
itself is undoubtedly state action, and if the aid itself violates the constitu-
tion, there is no need for a plaintiff to take the extra step of making an en-
tanglement argument. Indeed, the court did not find it necessary to perform
entanglement/entwinement analysis in any of the three cases discussed
above. 207
Finally, public function doctrine must be addressed if the attempted
remedial sale involves park land, because courts sometimes cite this doc-
trine in holding privately owned parks to be state actors. The Supreme
Court in Evans v. Newton established that courts have the power to scruti-
nize land transfers meant to cure constitutional violations.20 8 In Evans, a
town accepted a gift of land encumbered by a deed restriction that it be
kept as a whites-only park.209 When it became clear that the city could not
constitutionally run a segregated park, the city government attempted to
transfer the park to private trustees and claimed that it had thereby extin-
guished any state action violative of the Fourteenth Amendment.210 How-
ever, the Supreme Court held that state action persisted, reasoning that the
park fell within the "public function" line of cases, in which private actors
fulfilling a function that is traditionally the exclusive domain of govern-
ment are held to the Constitution as if they were state actors. 211
204. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001) (quoting
Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974)).
205. See id. at 299-300.
206. Cf Buono, 527 F.3d at 780 (invalidating the transfer in part because of the government's
planned provision of a memorial plaque).
207. See id. at 778-82; Mercier, 395 F.3d at 699; Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 490-94 (addressing only
the constitutionality of the sale).
208. See 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966).
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While the decision might appear a roadblock to governments wishing
to cure Establishment Clause violations by selling park property, Evans is
also significant for its somewhat narrow holding, and what the opinion did
not say. Namely, the Court did not hold that all public parks necessarily
qualify as a "public function," 212 but rather buttressed its conclusion by
noting that the defendant city government remained intimately involved in
the operation of this particular park by maintaining it as if it were still gov-
ernment property. 213 In fact, in Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, the Supreme
Court recently emphasized that public parks are not per se public functions
and suggested that the Evans decision in fact turned on ongoing govern-
ment control (i.e., the city's maintenance of the park) rather than the "pub-
lic function" doctrine.214 At the end of the day, Evans is better understood
as an example of a sham transaction, or, as the Flagg Bros. opinion put it,
"a finding of ordinary state action under extraordinary circumstances. ' 215
Thus, under current case law, private ownership of park-like land does not
automatically count as state action.216 Of course, courts must nevertheless
guard against sham sales of the sort in Evans, by ensuring that the private
buyers do in fact assume the traditional duties of ownership.
217
2. Cases Ineligible for Remedial Sale
Before examining the specific terms of a remedial sale, courts should
analyze whether a cure is possible at all through a sale. In some limited
cases, the nature or location of the display will preclude a cure via sale of
land.
a. Whether Some Displays Must Be Removed
The history of some displays might simply be too suspect to allow for
a remedial sale. Specifically, courts should not allow remedial sales in
situations where, given the state of the law at the time the government ac-
quired the display, the offending government knew or should have known
that the display violated the Establishment Clause. 218 Allowing a remedial
212. See, e.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946) (holding that a corporation maintaining
a privately owned "company town" was fulfilling a public function analogous to state action and thus
could be sued for violating the First Amendment).
213. Evans, 382 U.S. at 301.
214. See Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 159 n.8 (1978).
215. Id.
216. See id.
217. See Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 395 F.3d 693, 702 (7th Cir. 2005); Freedom from
Religion Found., Inc. v. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487, 492 (7th Cir. 2000).
218. Cf McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 859 (2005) (noting the importance of
Lemon's purpose prong and citing Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980) (per curiam)); Santa Fe
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sale after such bad faith acquisitions would open the door for governments
to confer advantages on a preferred sect by hosting a blatantly unconstitu-
tional display on a desirable piece of land and simply planning to sell the
land should someone challenge the display.219 In such cases the offending
government would violate the Establishment Clause not only by hosting an
unconstitutional display but also by planning to sell the land.220 Insofar as
it furthers those unconstitutional plans, a remedial sale would also serve to
endorse religion and therefore would violate the Establishment Clause.
Cases like this would hopefully be somewhat rare, but a "bad faith" excep-
tion to a general rule allowing remedial sales is necessary to prevent the
situation from arising. 221
As for proving bad faith, evidence of administrative or legislative his-
tory would obviously be relevant, 222 as would the nature of the display
itself. For instance, legislative history that evinced a purpose to indoctrinate
might raise suspicions of bad faith.223 Likewise, a display that serves no
other purpose than facilitating religious worship (for instance a church or
other place of worship) might be difficult to explain as good-faith acquisi-
tions. 224 It should, however, be noted that crosses will not necessarily qual-
ify as this type of inherently suspect display, as numerous courts have held
that cross displays can serve secular purposes.
225
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308-09 (2000); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56-61 (1985).
219. Cf Mercier, 395 F.3d at 702 (noting, "We are not endorsing a non-remedial initiative designed
to sell off patches of government land to various religious denominations as a means of circumventing
the Establishment Clause.").
220. See McCreary, 545 U.S. at 866 (holding that legislative intent is relevant to showing a reli-
gious purpose in acquiring a display). Justice Scalia argued that courts should not take the defendant
government's intent into account, because leads to different conclusions for identical displays. Id. at
907-908 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
221. Cf. id. at 859-69 (noting that the purpose prong "may rarely be determinative" but "neverthe-
less serves an important function" in Establishment Clause analysis (quoting Wallace, 472 U.S. at 75
(O'Connor, J., concurring))).
222. Cf id. at 866.
223. Cf. id. at 869 (noting the relevance of a county official's religious tone at the dedication
ceremony o the display in question); Stone, 449 U.S. at 41(holding that posting the Ten Commandments
in schools had a clearly improper religious purpose).
224. Cf. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 294 316 (2000) (striking down a law that
called for student-led prayer at football games); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 586-87 (1992) (holding
unconstitutional opening prayer at high school graduation ceremonies).
225. Lauderman, supra note 176, at 1222; see also Briggs v. Mississippi, 331 F.3d 499, 505-06
(5th Cir. 2003) (holding that a cross on the state flag of Mississippi did not violate the purpose prong of
Lemon); Separation of Church & State Comm. v. City of Eugene, 93 F.3d 617, 626 (9th Cir. 1996)
(O'Scannlain, J., concurring) (reasoning that a cross served a secular purpose when used a part of a war
memorial); Friedman v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 781 F.2d 777, 789 (10th Cir. 1985) (holding that a
cross in a city seal did not violate the Establishment Clause).
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b. Land That May Not Be Sold
Even if a display was not a bad faith acquisition, some government
land simply may not be sold. Such lands include those important to gov-
ernment function or highly symbolic due to their proximity to a seat of
government power, for instance a town hall or capitol grounds, respec-
tively.226 For example, if a city government decided to sell its town hall to
a private religious organization, the degree of religious favoritism apparent
in the transaction would almost certainly amount to endorsement in it-
self.227 Moreover, other lands have too much noneconomic value to the
public for a sale to be acceptable, because of their aesthetic, recreational, or
expressive importance. 228 For instance, an Establishment Clause-violating
cross planted atop Mount Rushmore would almost certainly need to be
removed. 229
3. Selling Land to Cure an Establishment Clause Violation
Next, if the history and location of the display would theoretically
permit a remedial sale, the court should proceed to determine whether the
particulars of a proposed sale would in fact cure the Establishment Clause
violation, keeping in mind that the sale itself must also satisfy constitu-
tional standards. At this point in analysis, the court will need to examine
both the method of the sale and the degree to which the sale would create
separation between the offending display and public land.
a. "Herculean" Government Efforts to Save a Display
Before even looking at the mechanics of a sale, some would argue that
mere evidence of government efforts to avoid removing a religious display
constitutes evidence of endorsement. 230 However, the government's pur-
pose in seeking a remedial sale may just as easily be secular as religious,
and therefore the magnitude of the government's efforts should be irrele-
vant. For instance, the government may have purposes in promoting reli-
gious tolerance, easing religious tensions within the community,231 and
226. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 599-600
(1989); Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 395 F.3d 693, 703 (7th Cir. 2005).
227. See Budd, supra note 21, at 231; cf also Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11 th Cir.
2003) (ordering the removal of a Ten Commandment monument in the foyer of the Alabama Supreme
Court building).
228. Budd, supra note 21, at 228.
229. See id.at 231.
230. See Buono v. Kempthome, 527 F.3d 758, 782 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted sub nom. Salazar
v. Buono, 77 U.S.L.W. 3243 (U.S. Feb. 23, 2009) (No. 08-472).
231. See Nystrom, supra note 158, at ch. 6.
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even seeking to recoup funds expended in dealing with the lawsuit. 232 As
discussed above, in cases such as Buono, where Congress itself has inter-
vened in the dispute, the courts should not assume without convincing evi-
dence that Congress had a primarily religious purpose in acting; the Court
has stated that it will "not lightly assume that Congress intended to infringe
constitutionally protected liberties .... ,,233 Thus, in deciding whether the
government had a religion-endorsing purpose when it sought a remedial
sale, the courts should look first to the stated purpose of the sale, if one
exists.234 They should only find endorsement of religion if presented with
clear evidence that the government had a religious purpose, regardless of
the magnitude of government efforts to prevent removal of a display.
b. Method of the Sale
When examining whether the method of the sale satisfies endorsement
standards, courts must also ensure that the state does not endorse religion
either through continuing its control over the land or by showing unfair
preference to certain potential buyers.
i. Conditions, Reversionary Interests, and Ongoing Maintenance
The state may not, through conditions or reversionary interests in the
sale, mandate that the buyer maintain a religious display.235 Such condi-
tions are tantamount to continuing government ownership of the display.
However, this rule does not mean that the government must make an un-
conditional sale of land; it should be allowed to make requirements about
non-religious aspects of the land-for instance, that the land be kept. open
to the public. 23 6 Although such conditions represent a measure of govern-
ment control, the control can hardly be said to endorse religion if it neither
encourages nor discourages religious expression.
In contrast, courts generally should not allow the government to con-
duct ongoing maintenance of the land sold. Such government action is
similar to that struck down in Evans, 237 and as in Evans, it often indicates a
232. Supra note 110.
233. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. and Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S.
568, 575 (1988) (addressing cannons of statutory construction).
234. See Lauderman, supra note 176, at 1218; cf also EdwardJ. DeBartolo Corp., 485 U.S. at 575.
235. See Buono v. Kempthome, 527 F.3d 758, 780 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted sub nom. Salazar
v. Buono, 77 U.S.L.W. 3243 (U.S. Feb. 23, 2009) (No. 08-472) (reasoning that if the government
exercises continuing control over the land, the land must be held to constitutional requirements).
236. Cf Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487, 490, 492-93 (7th
Cir. 2000) (upholding a sale despite a reversionary clause that the land be kept open to the public).
237. See Flagg Bros., v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 159 n.8 (discussing Evans).
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sham transaction in which the purchaser acts as a straw while the Govern-
ment retains the traditional duties of ownership. 238 Such maintenance al-
most always qualifies as endorsement of religion because it assists the
private owner in perpetuating religious speech.239 That said, a limited ex-
ception should exist where the government assistance is narrowly tailored
to enhance only the secular aspects of the private display; aid does not en-
dorse religion when it benefits a purely secular aspect of some enterprise in
which the government has a legitimate interest.240 For instance, whereas
mowing or lighting would assist all aspects of a display, both religious and
secular, provision of a purely nonreligious plaque designating the display
as a war memorial would only enhance the secular nature of the display,241
and the government has a legitimate interest in honoring veterans. 242 This
distinction is why the Buono court erred in reasoning that the government
provision of a plaque evinced endorsement of religion; the plaque was to
emphasize the secular historical aspect of the display.243 Conversely, the
Marshfield opinion is a good example of a case where the government re-
tained some control over the private land but nevertheless completed a
legitimate remedial sale. 244 The transfer involved a purely secular condi-
tion-that the land be kept open to the public-but at the same time did not
require religious speech or assist the new owners with the costs of their
religious speech. 245
ii. Mechanics of the Sale-May the Government Prefer a "Friendly
Buyer"?
Governments attempting a remedial sale will often try to sell the land
to the party who originally donated the display, or some other "friendly
buyer" who intends to maintain the display.246 Often, the endorsement test
238. See Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 395 F.3d 693, 702 (7th Cir. 2005); Marshfield, 203
F.3d at 492.
239. See Mercier, 395 F.3d at 702; Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 492.
240. Cf Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 801-02 (2000) (plurality opinion) (holding constitutional
the provision by government of secular materials to religious schools).
241. Cf id. at 809-10 (hinging analysis on whether government action subsidizes religious indoc-
trination).
242. See Buono v. Kempthome, 527 F.3d 758, 763-64 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted sub nom.
Salazar v. Buono, 77 U.S.L.W. 3243 (U.S. Feb. 23, 2009) (No. 08-472) (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting
from the denial of rehearing en banc).
243. See § 8137, supra note 147 (authorizing reinstallation of the original memorial plaque that
signified the cross as a memorial to the dead of all wars).
244. See Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 492-93.
245. See id. at 490.
246. See id.; Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 395 F.3d 693, 703 (7th Cir. 2005).
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will allow the state to favor sales to "friendly buyers. '247 Such favoritism
can be justified where the government has a secular interest in fostering
religious tolerance by showing respect for the religious beliefs represented
by the display. If the government seeks to promote religious tolerance by
showing respect for a display, then the government may legitimately in-
quire whether a prospective buyer will respectfully treat the display at is-
sue. 248 In contrast, the government may not favor a friendly buyer by
offering to sell the land for less than market value.249 Such "sweetheart
deals" could not likely find any legitimate secular justification and in any
case would endorse religion by gifting land to religious entities.250
Some object that strict neutrality should be required in the sale proc-
ess, because choosing a friendly buyer violates the endorsement test by
showing a government preference that a display remain.251 Adherents to
this notion believe that any remedial sale must be completely neutral, even
if that means ultimately selling the display to a buyer who intends to pro-
fane the religious symbol.252 Of course, a sale to such a "hostile buyer"
would likely stir up even greater community controversy, negating the
secular virtues (i.e. tolerance for religion and calming of religious tensions)
that supposedly justified the remedial sale.253 Thus, so the argument goes,
the preferable remedy is that the government remove the display in as non-
offensive a manner as possible. 254
The problem with this argument is that it ignores the compromise po-
sition that the government takes when it seeks a genuine, non-sham reme-
dial sale. The compromise lies between continuing government ownership
on the one hand and removal of the monument on the other. Just as the
government shows a preference for the religious message by owning and
displaying the monument, the government would show disapproval for
religion by knocking down or removing the monument. 255 A non-sham
247. Cf Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 492.
248. Cf Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 704 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting that the
removal of a monument because of its religious content can spur religious divisiveness).
249. Compare Annunziato v. New Haven Bd. of Alderman, 555 F. Supp. 427, 433 (D. Conn. 1982)
(holding that a one dollar sale of property to a church violated the Establishment Clause) with Marsh-
field, 203 F.3d at 492 (reasoning that it need not address the issue because the defendant paid fair
market value).
250. See Anunziato, 555 F. Supp. at 433; Lauderman, supra note 176, at 1225.
251. See Budd, supra note 21, at 246-49.
252. Id. at 247.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 253.
255. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 704 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring); ef also Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984) ("[T]he Constitution [does not] require complete separation of
church and state; it affirmatively mandates accommodation, not merely tolerance, of all religions, and
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remedial sale that ends government sponsorship of the display but permits
supporters of the message to take over the display represents a practical
compromise, and thus is often the course in which the government comes
closest to evincing neutrality toward the religious message at issue. 256 The
effect of selling to a friendly buyer might seem largely the same as if the
government required through reversionary interest that the religious display
be maintained, but the causation of the ongoing display remains a crucial
difference; in the former case the buyer's independent choice constitutes
the sole source of ongoing religious speech, while in the latter case the
government maintains a property right that compels religious expression.
257
For this reason, the former should be constitutional, while the latter should
not.258
c. Achieving Separation: Physical Attributes of the Land
Finally, even if a sale is permissible in all other respects, it must create
enough separation between the offending display and government land so
as to cure the Establishment Clause violation. When determining if this has
occurred, courts need to consider whether any demarcation exists between
the now-private and government land, as well as the size and layout of the
private land relative to adjoining government land.
i. Evident Separation Through Demarcation
Demarcation of newly private land will usually be necessary in order
to demonstrate to a reasonable observer that the government does not en-
dorse the religious speech present on the now-private land.259 This re-
quirement of course assumes that an observer might confuse the newly
private land with nearby government land. Demarcation might not be re-
quired in instances where the government has sold all of its land adjoining
the offending display.260 However, a complete sale often is not a viable
option, either because the adjoining government land is too large26 1 or be-
forbids hostility toward any.").
256. See Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 395 F.3d 693, 705 (7th Cir. 2005).
257. Cf Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 809-10 (2000) (plurality opinion) (holding constitutional
government aid to religious schools that does not result in religious indoctrination).
258. Cf. id.
259. See Budd, supra note 21, at 240; cf also Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette,
515 U.S. 753, 776 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that disclaimer signs help to remove doubt
about state approval of respondents' religious message).
260. Cf. Mercier v. City of La Crosse, 305 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1011 (W.D. Wis. 2004), rev'd sub.
nom. Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 395 F.3d 693 (7th Cir. 2005) (suggesting that it might have
upheld the sale if the city had sold its entire park).
261. Cf. Buono v. Kempthorne, 527 F.3d 758, 768 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted sub nor. Salazar
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cause a complete sale of the land would deprive the public of a socially
valuable space-such as a recreational park.
262
As for appearance, demarcation will usually take the form of a physi-
cal barrier and disclaimer signs.263 The physical barrier will likely be a
fence,264 but may take other forms, such as a surrounding wall of trees or a
clearing in the middle of trees,265 or anything else that would convey to
reasonable observers that different parties own the two different plots.
Sometimes, a physical barrier alone will prove insufficient to clearly con-
vey the message of different ownership, especially if the newly private land
has a history of public use. 266 As a result, courts will often need to require
disclaimer signs that communicate the difference in ownership and the
government's lack of endorsement.267
The size or location of such signs may become an issue in some cases,
especially where the offending display can be seen from a distance. 268 A
good rule of thumb is that, at a minimum, the demarcation should be visible
from the same distance as the religious nature of the display is discern-
able. 269 That way, the court avoids the case in which an observer could
pass close enough to notice the religious nature of the display without com-
ing close enough to perceive demarcation between public and private
land.270 However, in the case of displays that are clearly identifiable from
far away as religious symbols-large crosses, for example-such demarca-
tion may prove difficult to achieve. One might conceive of situations in
which the religious display is simply too dominant with respect to sur-
rounding public land for effective separation to be achieved,271 but most
often, strategic placement of signs will do the trick. For instance, in Buono,
the cross at issue was visible from a nearby highway but otherwise stood in
v. Buono, 77 U.S.L.W. 3243 (U.S. Feb. 23, 2009) (No. 08-472) (display within a 2,500 square mile
preserve).
262. Cf Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 395 F.3d 693, 695 (7th Cir. 2005).
263. See, e.g., id. at 698; Kong v. City and County of S.F., 18 Fed. App'x 616, 618 (9th Cir. 2001);
Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487, 497 (7th Cir. 2000).
264. See, e.g., Mercier, 395 F.3d at 697; Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. City of Marshfield,
No. 98-C-270-S, 2000 WL 767376, at *1 (W.D. Wis. 2000).
265. Kong, 18 Fed. App'x at 618.
266. See Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 497.
267. See Mercier, 395 F.3d at 703-04; Marshfield, 2000 WL 767376, at *1.
268. Cf Ind. Civil Liberties Union v. O'Bannon, 259 F.3d 766, 773 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that a
Ten Commandments display failed the endorsement test in part because the display's religious text was
larger than accompanying secular text and thus visible from a larger distance).
269. Cf id.
270. Cf id.
271. Cf Paulson v. City of San Diego, 294 F.3d 1124, 1125, 1133 (9th Cir. 2002) (striking down an
attempted transfer of a large hilltop cross as violative of the California Constitution).
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a remote area of the desert.
272 Had the sale been allowed, the government likely could have
achieved sufficient demarcation between its land and the newly private
land simply by placing disclaimer signs along the highway, thereby ensur-
ing that anybody likely to observe the cross would also observe the dis-
claimer.273
ii. Magnitude and Shape of Transfer
Beyond demarcation, the government must sell enough land to create
obvious separation between government and private land. Courts will need
to inquire whether the magnitude and shape of transfer creates enough
separation between the religious display and public land that users of gov-
ernment land will not reasonably perceive that the government endorses the
private display's religious message.274 However, because every plot of land
is unique, there can be no standard point of reference to inform the court
how much separation is enough. 275 The minimum required size of the
transfer will always depend on the fact finder's perception of the layout of
government land in relation to the private land, and therefore will always
be somewhat subjective.
276
Nevertheless, certain situations may present clearly insufficient trans-
fers. Particularly troublesome is the "donut hole" transfer, where the gov-
ernment conveys a tiny plot, scarcely larger than the display itself, that is
completely surrounded by public land.277 The situation is exacerbated if the
small parcel sits atop a hill that dominates the surrounding landscape.278 In
such situations, a small transfer will almost certainly fail to cure an en-
dorsement test violation, because the intimate proximity of the display to
government land confers an advantage on the ability of the particular relig-
ion to communicate its message to the public. 279 These sorts of transfers
either will need to be redone on a larger scale or they will fail to save the
272. See Buono v. Kempthorne, 527 F.3d 758, 768-69, 772 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted sub noma.
Salazar v. Buono, 77 U.S.L.W. 3243 (U.S. Feb. 23, 2009) (No. 08-472).
273. See supra note 1433.
274. See Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 395 F.3d 693, 703-04 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting that
the transfer does not deprive visitors enjoyment of the park); Budd, supra note 21, at 241-42; cf also
Murphy v. Bilbray, No. 90-134 GT, 1997 WL 754604, at *11 (S.D. Cal. 1997) (holding a transfer
invalid under California's No Preference clause, in part because the transfer was too small).
275. See Budd, supra note 21, at 242.
276. Id.
277. See Buono, 527 F.3d at 783.
278. See Murphy v. Bilbray, 782 F. Supp. 1420, 1436 (S.D. Cal. 1991); Budd, supra note 21, at
243.
279. See Budd, supra note 21, at 242.
2010] 437
CHICA GO-KENT LA W REVIEW
display.280
Many transfers will not present such easy cases and will require more
careful analysis. Despite the subjective nature of the inquiry, several com-
mon issues will often prove relevant. First, the size and visibility of the
display matters; larger and more prominent displays will usually require
larger transfers of land.281 In addition, the intended use of the public land
will be relevant, because private land open to the public carries with it a
greater likelihood that observers will perceive it to be public land.282 As
discussed above, the government will likely need to counteract this risk
with evident demarcation, except in the rare case where the government
decides to sell all adjoining government land.
Finally, the court should consider whether any amenities or infrastruc-
ture support the display, and if practicable, should require that the transfer
include those amenities or infrastructure. 283 For instance, if the display sits
as the evident focal point of a walkway leading up to it, continuing gov-
ernment ownership of the walkway would likely create a perception that
the government endorses the display.284 Likewise, if the display is sur-
rounded by benches oriented toward it, the government should include
those benches in any transfer. 285 In addition, courts might often find it use-
ful to consider whether the display has easy access to a public road and, if
so, whether some access point to the display was included in the transfer.
Otherwise the display may unnecessarily be left as an island completely
surrounded by park land.286 This concern is especially relevant if some
infrastructure at a likely access point, such as a driveway or parking lot,
supports access to the display and little else.287 Once again, continuing
280. See Mercier v. City of La Crosse, 305 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1011 (W.D. Wis. 2004), rev'd sub.
nom. Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 395 F.3d 693 (7th Cir. 2005); Budd, supra note 2 1, at 242.
281. See Budd, supra note 21, at 243; compare Murphy v. Bilbray, No. 90-134 GT, 1997 WL
754604, at *11 (S.D. Cal. 1997) (large hilltop cross) with Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 395
F.3d 693, 695 (7th Cir. 2005) (Ten Commandments monument in the comer of a park).
282. See Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487, 494 (7th Cir.
2000) (holding the display part of a public forum in part because of the land's dedication to public use).
283. See Budd, supra note 21, at 243; cf. also Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 490 (noting that the city
separated the electrical service for the rest of the park from the transferred land); Mercier, 395 F.3d at
695. The monument in Mercier was accessible by a path of which the city did not transfer any part. Id.
However, the path ran behind the monument and did not afford the monument "a particularly privileged
location in the aesthetic scheme of the Park." Id.
284. Cf. Mercier, 395 F.3d at 697, 705-06 (not requiring transfer of any section of a path that ran
behind the monument).
285. Cf. id. at 295 (noting the monument was not "displayed in a particularly prominent display or
setting").
286. Cf. Buono v. Kempthome, 527 F.3d 758, 783 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted sub noma. Salazar
v. Buono, 77 U.S.L.W. 3243 (U.S. Feb. 23, 2009) (No. 08-472).
287. Cf Mercier, 395 F.3d at 703 (noting that the transfer does not choke access to the park).
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government ownership of such amenities would likely communicate a mes-
sage of endorsement.
CONCLUSION
Every time a court orders a religious symbol torn down, it risks stir-
ring up a certain measure of religious tension in the affected community.
As the Van Orden plurality noted, our nation's capital and the rest of the
country are full of monuments that remind us of the importance of religion
to our national heritage. 288 Sometimes a measure of divisiveness will be the
necessary cost of ending a genuine Establishment Clause violation, but so
much the better if the court can achieve a remedy that both cures the viola-
tion and allows the symbol to remain. Such attempt at compromise should
be part of any jurisprudence that strives for government neutrality toward
religion. Hence, given certain requirements, even the Court's strictest Es-
tablishment Clause tests should allow defendant governments to sell land in
order to cure Establishment Clause violations arising from permanent
physical displays.
In analyzing remedial sales under the Court's current Lemon-
endorsement jurisprudence, courts must ensure that a sale satisfies two
separate constitutional concerns: first, that the sale itself is constitutional,
and second, that the sale ends the impermissible state action (i.e., creating
or hosting an unconstitutional display) that gave rise to an Establishment
Clause violation in the first place. In doing so, courts will need to ensure
sufficient separation between government land and the display by consider-
ing the location and history of the display, as well as the precise terms of
the proposed sale. Finally, if a completed sale comes close to achieving a
cure but contains some easily-fixed defect, the court need not undo the
entire sale but should instead take a cue from the Marshfield court and
order the fix. 289 Absent "unusual circumstances," remedial sales will often
prove to be effective and desirable remedies for Establishment Clause vio-
lations.290
288. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 688-89 (2005) (plurality opinion).
289. See Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487, 497 (7th Cir.
2000).
290. Id. at 491.
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